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行业动态 spectrum.ieee.org · @Richard Mitchell

AI效率可能让我们失去下一代专家

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作者以核电站控制设计为例,指出过度依赖自动化会让操作员技能退化,主张保留人工步骤以维持人类能力,类比AI可能带来的类似风险。

AI推荐理由 观点文章讨论AI效率可能削弱人类专家技能,基于作者核电站经验,但缺乏具体数据,对AI从业者参考价值有限。

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AI访客文章职业 AI效率可能让我们失去下一代专家 航空和核电的经验教训展示了如何保持人类技能 Richard Mitchell 2026年9月2日 6分钟阅读 Richard Mitchell是一位系统工程师,也是AuraSpark Technologies的创始人兼首席执行官。 James Steinberg 十多年前,我领导了美国核电站首个全数字控制系统的控制设计。从纸面上看,这是一台漂亮的机器——设计得像现代客机一样自行运行,操作员监视着一个很少需要他们的系统。我们做出了一个决定,在注重效率的观察者看来,这似乎是倒退:我们故意在系统可以自行执行的序列中保留了手动步骤。 我们在解决一个特定问题。一个只监督自动化的操作员会慢慢不再是一个操作员。双手变冷。对工厂实际在做什么的心理模型变得模糊。然后有一天自动化将控制权交回。那总是最糟糕的一天,因为自动化只有在困惑或遇到麻烦时才会退出。但到那时,你有一个坐在椅子上的人,他已经多年没有真正操作过这个东西了。手动步骤是为了保持人的熟练度。这是故意设计的低效。 那个工厂,碰巧,从未建成。它因这个国家核电周围的政治和经济而被搁置,原因与工程无关。但设计本能比项目更持久,我逐渐相信这是我能为现在每个董事会都在争论的问题提供的最有用的想法:当AI做了曾经培养专业知识的工作时,人类专业知识会怎样? AI正在扰乱工程职业阶梯 数据已经难以忽视。哈佛大学的一份工作论文涵盖了美国28万多家公司的约6500万工人,发现公司采用生成式AI后,初级就业率在六个季度内相对于未采用者下降了约9%,而高级就业率则持续增长。斯坦福大学对ADP工资记录的分析也指向同一方向:在AI暴露程度最高的职业中,最年轻的工人在2022年底后失去了优势,而他们更有经验的同事则保持了优势。斯坦福大学的研究人员发现,损失集中在AI自动化工作的地方;在AI仅增强工作的地方,初级就业率保持稳定或上升。 因果故事仍有争议,诚实要求我们这么说。纽约联储的研究人员将年轻毕业生失业率上升的大部分归因于远程工作,而不是AI,他们认为公司不愿雇用他们无法远程培训和指导的缺乏经验的人。但请注意这些解释的共同点。无论是模型吸收了形成性工作,还是距离切断了围绕它的指导,两者都描述了同一个破碎的机制:专业知识从高级传递到初级的学徒渠道。无论哪种方式,“入门级”已经悄然变成了“需要三年经验”。 剥离噪音,你只剩下一个看似简单的问题:你不能先成为初级工程师,然后成为高级工程师。专业知识不是下载的。它是通过失败的构建、死胡同的调试会话以及“到底为什么那样工作”的时刻获得的,而一个能干的AI现在会很乐意让新手免于这些。让他们免于足够多的这些,你就会产生一批能够在纸面上监督模型但从未培养出直觉感来知道模型何时自信地、灾难性地错误的人。 大多数评论止步于诊断,或者寻求将初级工作流失视为经济问题的政策解决方案。然而,这也是一个工程问题,安全关键领域已经花了几十年时间学习如何解决它。 航空关于自动化悖论的教训 我自己的职业生涯始于自动化的尖端。我毕业后的第一份工作是验证和确认数字喷气发动机控制器中的软件,该控制器决定战斗机发动机如何响应,比任何飞行员都快。即使在1980年代末,核心矛盾也是可见的:机器在常规情况下优于人类,但在机器未预料到的情况下,人类是飞机与灾难之间的唯一屏障。这种矛盾被称为自动化悖论,即越来越强大的自动化给人类操作员更少的练习,而只给他们留下最困难的情况。 航空业反复且代价高昂地学到了当人类技能在该差距内萎缩时会发生什么。典型的例子是2009年坠入大西洋的法航447航班。直接原因很平凡。结冰的空速传感器向自动驾驶仪提供了错误数据,它做了它设计要做的事情:它断开连接并将飞机控制权交还给机组人员。接下来发生的不是硬件故障。这是能力故障。一个可恢复的情况变成了不可恢复的情况,因为飞行员在数千小时观看自动化飞行的条件下,无法读取高空空气动力学失速并手动飞行摆脱它。飞机在工作。自动化悄悄侵蚀的训练没有。 行业的回应具有启发性,这与我们在核控制室所做的相同。它没有拆除自动驾驶仪。它故意将手动练习重新构建。2017年,FAA发布了安全警报17007“手动飞行操作熟练度”,宣布“手动飞行是其他技术飞行技能建立的基础”。该警报正式将技能衰退视为一种危险。一些航空公司修改了程序,鼓励在良好条件下手动飞行初始爬升和初始下降,明知牺牲一点燃油效率以保持机组人员的原始飞行 技能。这种权衡是重点。一个完美优化的系统产生无能力的操作员,根本就不是优化。它只是将其故障模式移到了电子表格看不到的地方。 手动门可以保持工程技能 将航空教训和核本能并置,它们指向我们现在在AI增强工作中需要的一种设计模式:故意的“手动门”。 手动门是工作流程中的一个点,人类在此接管控制,不是因为这是完成任务的最快方式,也不仅仅作为安全联锁,而是专门为了锻炼和保持否则会衰退的技能。其显著特征是它是被选择的。你作为设计问题决定你的组织必须保持哪些能力在人类身上,因为那些是你在糟糕日子需要的。然后你设计所需的摩擦来保持它们温暖。 想象这在依赖AI编写大部分代码的软件团队中如何运作。团队围绕其最不能失去的技能放置一个手动门:调试。当关键模块中出现缺陷时,指定的工程师——故意地,通常是初级工程师——必须首先重现故障,追溯到根本原因,并编写一个捕获该错误的自动化测试,所有这些都在AI助手关闭的情况下进行。只有在工程师提交诊断后,模型才重新打开,以提出修复方案、生成替代方案并扫描代码库以查找类似错误。然后工程师将他们的诊断与模型的诊断进行比较。当两者不一致时,这就是设计在起作用,在糟糕日子之前而不是期间浮出分歧。 这种方法完全重新定义了初级工程师。今天的本能是让AI做入门级工作,因为它更快更便宜。但其中一些工作不是要消除的开销。它是你未来高级员工的培训设备,你应该像保护任何其他关键基础设施一样保护它。它可能在本季度效率不高,但悄悄拆除它会在十年后抵押你的能力。 为什么公司必须继续培训初级工程师 这些都不是免费的,假装否则会侮辱那些必须签署预算的人。故意的手动门在近期内必然比完全自动化效率低。让初级人员做形成性工作并运行手动序列,现在花费一些东西来保护以后的东西。 在一个以季度业绩评判大多数领导者的市场中,这是一个难以推销的主张。一个雇佣的高管如果带着AI可以取代的“不必要”人类,会在回报到来之前很久就听到董事会的意见。这个数学只对不受这种压力影响的人有效:有控制权的创始人、私营公司、真正有长远眼光的机构,或者愿意要求工人定期展示技能(如飞行员必须做的)的监管者。这意味着最有可能保持自身专业知识的组织是那些在结构上能够将短期利润用于长期能力的组织;其他所有人将需要外部推动。 所以这里是一句话的论点:故意的低效不是浪费。在安全关键工程中,我们一直知道它是保险,我们故意购买它。随着AI接管锻造专业知识的工作,聪明的举动不是抵制自动化。而是通过设计让我们的手保持在控制上——这样当自动化失败时,它最终总是会失败,椅子上仍然有知道如何飞行的人。 来自您网站的文章 新工程师在AI时代蓬勃发展的7种方式 › 早期职业工程师如何领先于AI › 成为一名适应性强的工程师需要什么 › 网络相关文章 AI工程师培训 | Microsoft Learn › 工程职业生成式AI自动化悖论航空核电 Richard Mitchell Richard Mitchell是一位系统工程师,在安全关键控制领域拥有约38年经验,涵盖喷气发动机控制系统验证、电厂优化、数字核控制和飞机模拟。他拥有BSEE、MBA学位,是INCOSE认证的专家系统工程师,并且是AuraSpark Technologies的创始人兼首席执行官。 计算访谈 声音如何让大数据变得有意义 5分钟 6分钟阅读 机器人技术赞助文章 保护动态工业机器人电缆载体 2026年9月3日 3分钟阅读 航空航天杂志专题2026年9月 新的NASA设计为核动力航天器增压 2026年8月26日 13分钟阅读 能源新闻 西班牙在能源动荡中放缓核淘汰 生物医学新闻 AI现在可以设计功能性病毒。我们应该担心吗? 航空航天新闻 这些核电池可能支持未来的月球基地
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AIGuest ArticleCareers AI Efficiency Could Cost Us the Next Generation of Experts Lessons from aviation and nuclear power show how to preserve human skills Richard Mitchell 02 Sep 2026 6 min read Richard Mitchell is a systems engineer and the founder and CEO of AuraSpark Technologies. James Steinberg A little over a decade ago, I led the controls design for a first-of-its-kind full digital-control system for a U.S. nuclear plant. It was, on paper, a beautiful machine—engineered to run itself the way a modern airliner does, with operators watching over a system that rarely needed them. And we made a decision that, to an efficiency-minded observer, looked backward: We deliberately left manual steps inside sequences the system could execute on its own. We were solving a specific problem. An operator who only ever supervises automation slowly stops being an operator. The hands go cold. The mental model of what the plant is actually doing gets fuzzy. Then comes the day the automation hands control back. It’s always the worst day, because automation only quits when it’s confused or in trouble. But by then, you have a person in the chair who hasn’t truly operated the thing in years. The manual steps were there to keep the human current. It was inefficient by design, on purpose. That plant, as it happened, was never built. It was shelved amid the politics and economics that surround nuclear power in this country, for reasons that had nothing to do with the engineering. But the design instinct outlived the project, and I’ve come to believe it’s the most useful idea I can offer to the argument now consuming every boardroom: What happens to human expertise when AI does the work that used to build it? AI Is Disrupting the Engineering Career Ladder The data has gotten hard to wave away. A Harvard University working paper covering some 65 million workers at more than 280,000 U.S. firms found that after companies adopted generative AI, junior employment fell roughly 9 percent within six quarters relative to nonadopters, while senior employment kept right on growing. A Stanford analysis of ADP payroll records points the same way: The youngest workers in the most AI-exposed occupations lost ground after late 2022 while their more-experienced colleagues held theirs. The Stanford researchers found that the losses concentrate where AI automates the work; where it merely augments, junior employment holds steady or rises. The causal story is still contested, and honesty requires saying so. Researchers at the New York Fed attribute much of the rise in young-graduate unemployment not to AI but to remote work, arguing that firms are reluctant to hire inexperienced people whom they cannot train and mentor at a distance. But notice what the explanations share. Whether a model is absorbing the formative work or distance is severing the mentorship around it, both describe the same broken mechanism: the apprenticeship channel through which expertise passes from senior to junior. Either way, “entry-level” has quietly come to mean “three years of experience required.” Strip away the noise and you’re left with one deceptively simple problem: You cannot become a senior engineer without first being a junior one. Expertise is not downloaded. It is earned through failed builds, dead-end debugging sessions, and the “why on earth did that work” moments that a capable AI will now happily spare the newcomer. Spare them enough of those and you produce a cohort that can supervise a model on paper but never developed the gut sense to know when the model is confidently, catastrophically wrong. Most of the commentary stops at the diagnosis, or reaches for policy solutions that treat the loss of junior jobs as an economic problem. Yet it’s also an engineering problem, and safety-critical fields have already spent decades learning how to solve it. Aviation’s Lessons About the Automation Paradox My own career started at the sharp end of automation. My first job out of school was verifying and validating the software in the digital jet-engine controller that decides, faster than any pilot could, how a fighter plane’s engine responds. Even then, in the late 1980s, the central tension was visible: The machine outperforms the human in routine cases, but the human is all that stands between the aircraft and disaster in the cases the machine didn’t anticipate. This tension is known as the automation paradox, in which increasingly capable automation gives human operators less practice, while leaving them only the most difficult situations. Aviation learned, repeatedly and expensively, what happens when human skills atrophy inside that gap. The canonical example is Air France flight 447, which fell into the Atlantic in 2009. The proximate cause was mundane. Iced-over airspeed sensors fed the autopilot bad data, and it did what it is designed to do: It disconnected and handed control of the airplane back to the crew. What followed was not a hardware failure. It was a competence failure. A recoverable situation became an unrecoverable one because the pilots, conditioned by thousands of hours of watching the automation fly, could not read a high-altitude aerodynamic stall and hand-fly their way out of it. The airplane was working. The training the automation had quietly eroded was not. The industry’s response is instructive, and it’s the same move we made in that nuclear control room. It did not rip out the autopilot. It built deliberate manual practice back in. In 2017 the FAA issued Safety Alert for Operators 17007, “Manual Flight Operations Proficiency,” declaring that “manual flight is the foundation upon which other technical flying skills are built.” The alert formally recognized skill decay as a hazard in its own right. Some airlines amended their procedures to encourage hand-flying both the initial climb and initial descent in benign conditions, knowingly trading a sliver of fuel efficiency to keep the crew’s raw flying skills alive. That trade is the whole point. A perfectly optimized system that produces incompetent operators is not optimized at all. It has simply moved its failure mode somewhere the spreadsheet can’t see it. Manual Gates Could Preserve Engineering Skills Put the aviation lesson and the nuclear instinct side by side and they point to one design pattern we now need in AI-augmented work: the deliberate “manual gate.” A manual gate is a point in a workflow where a human takes the controls, not because it is the fastest way to get the task done, and not only as a safety interlock, but specifically to exercise and preserve a skill that would otherwise decay. The distinguishing feature is that it is chosen. You decide, as a matter of design, which competencies your organization must keep alive in human beings because those are the ones you will need on the bad day. Then you engineer the friction required to keep them warm. Picture how this might work on a software team that leans on AI for most of its code. The team places a manual gate around the skill it can least afford to lose: debugging. When a defect surfaces in a critical module, the assigned engineer—deliberately, often a junior one—must first reproduce the failure, trace it to root cause, and write an automated test that captures the bug, all with the AI assistant switched off. Only after the engineer commits to a diagnosis does the model come back on, to propose the fix, generate alternatives, and sweep the code base for similar bugs. The engineer then compares their diagnosis against the model’s. When the two disagree, that’s the design working, surfacing the disagreement before the bad day instead of during it. This approach reframes the junior engineer entirely. The instinct today is to let AI do the entry-level work because it is faster and cheaper. But some of that work is not overhead to be eliminated. It is the training apparatus of your future senior staff, and you should protect it the way you’d protect any other piece of critical infrastructure. It may not be efficient this quarter, but dismantling it quietly mortgages your capability a decade out. Why Companies Must Keep Training Junior Engineers None of this is free, and pretending otherwise would insult the people who have to sign the budgets. A deliberate manual gate is, by construction, less efficient in the near term than full automation. Keeping juniors doing formative work and running the manual sequences costs something now to protect something later. That’s a hard sell in a market that judges most leaders on quarterly results. A hired executive who carries “unnecessary” humans that AI could replace will hear about it from the board long before the payoff arrives. The math only works for someone insulated from that pressure: a founder with control, a private company, an institution with a genuinely long horizon, or a regulator willing to require workers to demonstrate their skills regularly, as pilots must. Which means the organizations most likely to preserve their own expertise are the ones structurally able to spend short-term margin on long-term capability; everyone else will need that outside push. So here is the argument, in one line: Deliberate inefficiency is not waste. In safety-critical engineering we have always known it as insurance, and we buy it on purpose. As AI takes over the work where expertise is forged, the smart move is not to resist the automation. It is to keep our hands on the controls by design—so that when the automation fails, as it always eventually does, there is still someone in the chair who knows how to fly. From Your Site Articles 7 Ways New Engineers Can Flourish in the Age of AI › How to Stay Ahead of AI as an Early-Career Engineer › What It Takes to Be an Adaptable Engineer › Related Articles Around the Web Training for AI engineers | Microsoft Learn › engineering careersgenerative aiautomation paradoxaviationnuclear power Richard Mitchell Richard Mitchell is a systems engineer with roughly 38 years in safety-critical controls, spanning jet-engine control-system verification, power-plant optimization, digital nuclear control, and aircraft simulation. He has a BSEE, an MBA, is an INCOSE-certified Expert Systems Engineering Professional, and is the founder and CEO of AuraSpark Technologies. 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