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@Pengxun Li, Litian Zhang, Jianwei Hou, Shujiang Wu, Song Li, Zifeng Kang, Xi Zhang
研究警告:攻击者控制的钩子更新可操纵AI代理执行恶意行为
该论文研究AI代理框架中的生命周期钩子安全问题。这类钩子将shell命令绑定到运行时事件并以主机权限执行。作者发现攻击者若控制钩子更新,可引导代理执行恶意行为。
AI推荐理由 AI代理框架中的钩子以主机权限运行,攻击者若能控制钩子更新,就可能劫持任何依赖这些框架的代理,造成供应链级安全风险。开发者和平台需要强化钩子来源的验证与隔离,否则此类问题将成为AI应用部署中的新攻击面。
80
正文
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
arXiv:2609.03884 (cs)
[Submitted on 3 Sep 2026 (v1), last revised 8 Sep 2026 (this version, v2)]
Title:A Blind Trust, the Bloody Thrust: When Attacker-Controlled Hook Updates Steer AI Agent Harnesses towards Malicious Behaviors
Authors:Pengxun Li, Litian Zhang, Jianwei Hou, Shujiang Wu, Song Li, Zifeng Kang, Xi Zhang
View a PDF of the paper titled A Blind Trust, the Bloody Thrust: When Attacker-Controlled Hook Updates Steer AI Agent Harnesses towards Malicious Behaviors, by Pengxun Li and 6 other authors
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Abstract:Modern AI agent harnesses expose lifecycle hooks that bind shell commands to runtime events such as session start, tool calls, and file edits. These commands run with host privileges yet ship as lifecycle-hook configuration and may fire at times the LLM never observes. We identify the lifecycle-hook update path, which harnesses trust blindly, as a new attack surface. Under a supply-chain threat model in which an attacker controls only plugin metadata and lifecycle-hook configuration, a benign versioned plugin can be trojanized by an update that silently binds attacker-chosen commands to benign events, yielding malicious host-side behavior such as privilege escalation. We propose HookPry, an open-source and fully automated attack framework that systematically exploits this vulnerability across heterogeneous AI agent harnesses. HookPry realizes ten attack objectives; across 25 combinations of harnesses and backends in 1,000 end-to-end runs, it compromises all seven evaluated harnesses, with per-harness success rates reaching 92.5%. Representative defenses remain insufficient: Microsoft Defender has 0% recall, and the union of three static defenses misses 47.5% of malicious artifacts.
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Subjects:
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as:
arXiv:2609.03884 [cs.CR]
(or
arXiv:2609.03884v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.03884
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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
Submission history
From: Pengxun Li [view email]
[v1]
Thu, 3 Sep 2026 14:08:42 UTC (3,145 KB)
[v2]
Tue, 8 Sep 2026 12:59:09 UTC (3,144 KB)
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来源报道 · 2 篇 · 以下链接均前往原始媒体
Pengxun Li, Litian Zhang, Jianwei Hou, Shujiang Wu, Song Li, Zifeng Kang, Xi Zhang
研究警告:攻击者控制的钩子更新可操纵AI代理执行恶意行为
09-04 · 论文跨栏公告