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论文研究 全球精选 · @Ali Akarma, Toqeer Ali Syed, Muhammad Khan, Qurat-ul-ain Mastoi, Adeel Ahmad

联邦学习中基于梯度的客户端身份推断攻击与防御:面向车联网惯性传感场景

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这篇论文研究联邦学习在车联网边缘智能应用中的隐私泄露问题。作者提出了一种基于梯度信息的客户端身份推断攻击方法,并探讨了相应的防御策略。该研究旨在提升联邦学习在惯性传感等敏感数据场景下的安全性。

AI推荐理由 该研究表明联邦学习在惯性传感场景下并非天然隐私安全,梯度信息可被用于推断客户端身份,部署时应考虑梯度扰动、安全聚合等防御手段,否则可能面临敏感数据泄露和合规风险。这提醒AI从业者在车联网等边缘联邦学习项目中,需将隐私攻击纳入威胁模型并采取相应防护。

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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security arXiv:2609.02971 (cs) [Submitted on 2 Sep 2026 (v1), last revised 5 Sep 2026 (this version, v2)] Title:Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning: Gradient-Based Client Identity Inference and Defenses for Inertial Sensing in Vehicular Edge Networks Authors:Ali Akarma, Toqeer Ali Syed, Muhammad Khan, Qurat-ul-ain Mastoi, Adeel Ahmad View a PDF of the paper titled Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning: Gradient-Based Client Identity Inference and Defenses for Inertial Sensing in Vehicular Edge Networks, by Ali Akarma and 3 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:As vehicular networks move toward 5G/6G edge intelligence, federated learning (FL) is widely promoted as a privacy-preserving way for vehicles and infrastructure to train shared models without exposing raw sensor data. Yet the updates clients transmit still leak enough information to identify who sent them, which threatens the anonymity that safety-critical V2X applications assume and adds to existing concerns over adversarial ML, model poisoning, and backdoor attacks. We study server-side client identity inference from transmitted weight deltas using inertial (IMU) measurements, evaluated on the UCI Human Activity Recognition (HAR) benchmark as an accessible proxy for the IMU streams produced onboard connected vehicles. Across five attack classifiers and five non-IID partitions, an honest-but-curious server recovers client identity with near-perfect accuracy (approximately 1.000) from undefended updates, confirming a concrete identifiability risk. We then quantify the privacy-utility trade-off of a lightweight clip-then-noise defense by sweeping Gaussian noise (sigma in {0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50, 1.00}) at fixed clipping (C=1.0), and report formal (epsilon, delta)-DP budgets through Renyi accounting. A practical region (sigma in [0.1, 0.2]) drives attack accuracy to near-random while costing under 5% relative FL accuracy. Ensemble FL supplies complementary structural privacy with a 1/K anonymity-set bound and no noise penalty. Results are supported by cryptographic (SHA-256) train/evaluation gradient disjointness, three seeds, and a count-normalized attacker-advantage metric. We position HAR explicitly as a proxy and discuss what validation on true vehicular telemetry would require. Comments: Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) Cite as: arXiv:2609.02971 [cs.CR] (or arXiv:2609.02971v2 [cs.CR] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.02971 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Ali Akarma [view email] [v1] Wed, 2 Sep 2026 09:49:39 UTC (2,198 KB) [v2] Sat, 5 Sep 2026 10:06:01 UTC (2,198 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning: Gradient-Based Client Identity Inference and Defenses for Inertial Sensing in Vehicular Edge Networks, by Ali Akarma and 3 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: cs.CR new | recent | 2026-09 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG cs.NI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation × loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate (What is Replicate?) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs. Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)

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Ali Akarma, Toqeer Ali Syed, Muhammad Khan, Qurat-ul-ain Mastoi, Adeel Ahmad 联邦学习中基于梯度的客户端身份推断攻击与防御:面向车联网惯性传感场景 09-04 · 论文跨栏公告
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